Georgia Law Review
Volume 53

Number 2

Article 10

2019

Guidance Is Definitive, Reality Is Frequently Inaccurate: The
Lingering Saga of Rev. Rul. 91-32
Robert L. Daily
University of Georgia School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr
Part of the Taxation-Transnational Commons, and the Tax Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Daily, Robert L. (2019) "Guidance Is Definitive, Reality Is Frequently Inaccurate: The Lingering Saga of Rev.
Rul. 91-32," Georgia Law Review: Vol. 53: No. 2, Article 10.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/10

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University of
Georgia School of Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more information, please
contact tstriepe@uga.edu.

Daily: Guidance Is Definitive, Reality Is Frequently Inaccurate: The Lin

GUIDANCE IS DEFINITIVE, REALITY IS
FREQUENTLY INACCURATE: THE
LINGERING SAGA OF REV. RUL. 91-32
Robert L. Daily
Partnership and international taxation are two of the
most mind-numbing and inconsistent areas of the law.
Even more confusion occurs when the two intersect, such
as when a nonresident sells an interest in a U.S.
partnership. Many have wasted precious time and
abundant ink to come up with a solution. The IRS first
tried in Rev. Rul. 91-32, concluding that a nonresident
would be subject to tax if the partnership had assets
producing income generated from property in United
States. Although the guidance was appropriately
criticized for being statutorily inconsistent, this Note
argues that it nonetheless got to the right policy outcome.
In 2017, the Tax Court disagreed with the long-standing
IRS guidance; it declined to defer to the IRS’s
interpretation and held that a nonresident selling a U.S.
partnership interest would not be subject to tax. Fearing
abuse, Congress enacted a “look-through” approach in
§ 864(c)(8) that requires nonresidents to pay tax on the
gain from the sale of a U.S. partnership under certain
circumstances. Unfortunately, Congress created a
burdensome system for nonresidents trying to sell their
partnership interest.
This Note recounts the lingering saga of Rev. Rul. 9132 and illustrates why the intersection of partnership
taxation and international taxation remains convoluted,
unfair, and unwieldy. This Note also provides
recommendations to Congress that will lessen the
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administrative headache and provide for a more
equitable way to tax nonresidents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
“In my own case the words of such an act as the Income
Tax, for example, merely dance before my eyes in a
meaningless procession: cross-reference to crossreference, exception upon exception—couched in abstract
terms that offer no handle to seize hold of—leave in my
mind only a confused sense of some vitally important,
but successfully concealed, purport, which it is my duty
to extract, but which is within my power, if at all, only
after the most inordinate expenditure of time.”1
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the Department of
Treasury want taxpayers to believe that their guidance is definitive,
but that may not reflect reality.2 With regulations, the IRS and
Treasury’s interpretation often carries the day. Most courts adopt
and agree with the Treasury’s and the IRS’s definitive conclusion on
the law if there is a regulation on point.3 But courts do not give the
same level of deference to sub-regulatory guidance. And taxpayers
are more willing than ever to challenge the authority and
conclusions of this type of administrative guidance.4
A recent example of that willingness to question guidance
occurred in Grecian Magnesite Mining, Industrial & Shipping Co.
v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (GMM).5 The taxpayer
questioned a longstanding piece of guidance issued by the IRS,
Revenue Ruling 91-32 (Rev. Rul. 91-32).6 Published in 1991, Rev,
Learned Hand, Thomas Walter Swan, 57 YALE L. J. 167, 169 (1947).
The inspiration for my title came from a notice in the Hitchhiker’s Guide to the Galaxy.
See DOUGLAS ADAMS, THE ULTIMATE HITCHHIKER’S GUIDE TO THE GALAXY 174 (2002) (“The
Guide is definitive. Reality is frequently inaccurate.”).
3 See Kent Barnett & Christopher J. Walker, Chevron in the Circuit Courts, 116 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 54 tbl.2 (2017) (noting that the government wins 81.5% of tax cases when circuit
courts apply Chevron deference).
4 See Lee A. Sheppard, A New Model for Taxation of Nonresident Partners, 150 TAX NOTES
TODAY 657, 657–658 (Aug. 7, 2017) (noting that “Silicon Valley has also upended
administration of income taxes” by “declar[ing] war on excessive exercises of administrative
power,” so that “business taxpayers everywhere have become emboldened to challenge
guidance they may have accepted for years”).
5 149 T.C. No. 3 (2017), appeal docketed, No. 19215-12 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2017), partially
superseded by statute, I.R.C. § 864(c)(8) (2018). See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the
case’s holding.
6 Id.
1
2
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Rul. 91-32 classified the gain or loss from the sale of a partnership
that has “fixed place of business” or “a permanent establishment in
the U.S.” as effectively connected income, which is subject to
taxation by the United States.7
In GMM, the Greek corporation argued that “[w]hile the Ruling
may provide a rational policy argument for imposing tax on sales of
partnership interests by foreign partners, it does not provide a
cogent explanation of how [the IRS] purports to reach that
conclusion under current law.”8 The Tax Court agreed with the
taxpayers, issuing a thorough opinion that all but eviscerated the
long-standing piece of guidance.9
The facts were straightforward. The taxpayer was a Greek
corporation that had invested in a U.S. partnership.10 The U.S.
partnership mined and extracted magnesite in various states in the
United States.11 The taxpayer redeemed its partnership interest at
a significant gain.12 The taxpayer had no office in the United States,
nor did it have any U.S. “office, employees, or business operation”
outside of its investment in the U.S. partnership.13 The issue was
simple: is a nonresident subject to U.S. federal income tax when it
disposes or redeems its interest in a U.S. partnership for a gain?14
The GMM court said the answer to that question depended on
partnership tax theory, framed as a debate over the eternal question
of whether a partnership should be taxed as an agglomeration of its
partners (aggregate theory), or as an entity separate and distinct
from its owners (entity theory).15 The IRS in Rev. Rul. 91-32
Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875.
Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 88–89, GMM, 149 T.C. No. 3 (2017) (No. 19215-12), 2014 WL
10123472 at *40.
9 GMM, 149 T.C. No. 3 at 34 (“We decline to defer to [Rev. Rul. 91-32].”).
10 Id. at 6.
11 Id. at 6–7.
12 Id. at 8.
13 Id. at 6.
14 Id. at 12. The partnership also had gain attributable to U.S. real estate which is taxable
under I.R.C. § 897(g) (2017) (more commonly known as “FIRPTA” gain). That gain was
stipulated, however, and was not an issue at trial. Id. at 18.
15 See id. at 16 (“[O]ne way of describing the dispute in this case is to say it raises the
question whether, as to a foreign partner’s liquidation of its interest in a U.S. partnership,
the ‘entity’ approach applies (as GMM contends) so that the gain arises from the sale of a
single asset (i.e., GMM’s interest in the U.S. partnership), or instead the ‘aggregation’
approach applies (as the Commissioner contends), so that the gain arises from the sale of
GMM’s interest in the assets that make up the partnership’s business, in which business
7
8
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primarily used the aggregate theory and said that the selling
partner’s gain would be taxable in the U.S. because it would be
effectively connected income to the taxpayer.16 Although many tax
lawyers criticized Rev. Rul. 91-32 prior to GMM,17 most nonetheless
accepted it as the law of the land.18
The IRS unsuccessfully put forward the Rev. Rul. 91-32
argument in GMM.19 The GMM court sharply criticized the IRS for
its revenue ruling, noting that the IRS’s position contradicted
general theories of partnership taxation.20 The Tax Court instead
used the entity theory and held that the gain would not be taxable
in the United States.21 Yet, this framing only helps so much.22 The
GMM court interpreted international tax statutes and regulations
based on general theories of partnership tax; in trying to fit these
concepts together, the court attempted to answer the unanswerable.
Congress superseded GMM’s core holding in the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act (TCJA), codified as I.R.C. § 864(c)(8).23 The statute uses a
GMM is conceived of as having been engaged.”); see also William S. McKee et al., FED. TAX’N
PARTNERSHIPS & PARTNERS at ¶ 1.02 (2018) (discussing the differences between the
aggregate and entity theories of partnership taxation).
16 Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875.
17 See William W. Bell & David B. Shoemaker, Revenue Ruling 91-32: Right Result for the
Wrong Reasons, 9 J. PARTNERSHIP TAX’N 80, 88 (1992) (“Revenue Ruling 91-32 reads like
Marbury v. Madison, relying principally upon ‘the nature of things’ and then adding its own
gloss and substance to a variety of issues that are not addressed by statute, regulation, or
treaty.”); Kimberly S. Blanchard, Rev. Rul. 91-32: Extrastatutory Attribution of Partnership
Activities to Partners, 76 TAX NOTES 1331 (Sep. 8, 1997) (“Rev. Rul. 91-32 represents a truly
unprecedented application of attributional principles not sanctioned or even suggested by any
provision of the code. It appears doubtful that the ruling would withstand scrutiny by a
court.”).
18
See Rufus Rhoades & Cynthia Brittain, 2017 Emerging Issues 7584, An Analysis of
Grecian Magnesite Mining, Industrial & Shipping Co., SA v. Comm’r, Sept. 22, 2017 (LEXIS)
(noting that the GMM “decision surprised virtually everyone”).
19 Respondent’s Answering Brief at 101, GMM, 149 T.C. No. 3 (2017) (No. 19215-12), 2014
WL 10123471.
20 See infra Part III.C.
21 Id.
22 See Robert J. Staffaroni, Partnerships: Aggregate vs. Entity and U.S. International
Taxation, 49 TAX LAW. 55, 58 (1995) (noting that “the aggregate or entity label is a convenient
shorthand for what often are more subtle and more difficult issues”).
23 See I.R.C. § 864(c)(8) (2018); see also infra Part IV (discussing the TCJA’s entityaggregate approach to foreign partner transactions). A word of caution: the Government has
appealed the GMM decision, but the appeal does not affect this Note’s main point: that
Congress needs to adopt wholesale change regarding the interaction between partnership and
international taxation. The appeal also does not affect this Note’s analysis of the
government’s aggregate theory argument because the government did not raise this
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look-through approach that requires nonresidents to pay tax on any
gain they earn from selling an interest in a partnership doing
business in the United States.24 But the saga of Rev. Rul. 91-32
remains. The statutes and regulations that apply to the intersection
of partnership and international taxation remain convoluted,
unfair, and unwieldy. After the TCJA, nonresidents will be unable
to comply with their tax obligations without the help of
sophisticated tax advisers. Congress should adopt wholesale
changes to ensure that foreign individuals and entities are
equitably taxed and can comply with their U.S. tax obligations in a
non-onerous way.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II explains core concepts
needed to understand the debate over this intersection of
partnership and international taxation. Part III then articulates the
distinctions between the entity and aggregate theories of
partnership. Part III also examines how the entity and aggregate
theories have been applied to foreign partner transactions via the
practitioner presumption, Rev. Rul. 91-32, the GMM case, and the
newly enacted § 864(c)(8). Part IV discusses how Congress can
provide a better solution to fix the intersection of partnership and
international taxation. Part V concludes.
II. NONRESIDENTS & PARTNERSHIPS
Before getting into the central debate over entity theory versus
aggregate theory, this Note will provide context for the debate about
Rev. Rul. 91-32. This part will lay out the statutory and regulatory
principles of both partnership and international taxation.25

argument on appeal. See Opening Brief for the Appellant at 19–20, GMM, No. 17-1268 (D.C.
Cir. June 8, 2018), 2018 WL 2761967.
24 See I.R.C. § 864(c)(8).
25 A few partnership concepts are outside the scope of this Note: the implications of the
GMM decision on publicly traded partnerships, foreign personal holding corporations,
partnerships that have withholding obligations, and nonresidents seeking benefits from U.S.
tax treaties with foreign governments.
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A. TAXING PARTNERS IN PARTNERSHIPS?

Start with a basic proposition: partnerships do not pay federal
income tax.26 Instead, the partnership calculates its taxable income
as if the partnership were an individual and gives its partners a
schedule K-1 which shows each partner’s share of that income.27
Partners must pay tax on their “distributive share” of income from
the partnership.28
But all good things must end. Eventually, a partner sells her
interest in the partnership, or the partnership stops operating.29 In
either case, a partner will recognize gain on the sale of her
partnership interest if her proceeds from the sale exceed her basis
in the partnership.30 The partnership interest is considered a
capital asset,31 but selling that interest is considered a sale of
personal property.32 Generally, that gain will be capital, which
allows the partner to pay tax at a preferential capital gains rate.33
A part of the gain, however, will be considered ordinary if the
partnership holds assets that produce ordinary income.34
The government’s ability to tax a partner disposing of her
partnership interest is critical. Partners contributing to a
partnership for a partnership interest do not recognize gain or loss
on that transaction.35 And partnerships do not recognize gain or loss

26 I.R.C. § 701 (2012). But see I.R.C. § 6225 (2016) (noting that under the new partnership
audit regime, some partnerships will pay an “imputed underpayment,” which may be
considered a “tax” for § 701 purposes).
27 I.R.C. § 702 (2012).
28 I.R.C. § 721 (2012). The timing and character of the income will not change on the
partner. See Staffaroni, supra note 22, at 60 n.13 (discussing Treas. Reg. 1.702-1(b) and
noting that “the character of a partnership item ordinarily is determined at the partnership
level and taken into account by the partner separately”).
29 A third possibility would be if the partner died and the partner’s heirs inherited the
partnership interest. In this case, heirs would receive a stepped-up basis in their partnership
interest under I.R.C. § 1014 (2012), but their inside basis in the partnership’s assets would
not change.
30 A little more technical: I.R.C. § 736 (2012) will govern in cases of redemption, whereas
I.R.C. §731 (2012) will control sales.
31 I.R.C. § 741 (2012).
32 This distinction is important for the international tax rules, as the sourcing of personal
property will depend on I.R.C. § 865 (2012).
33 I.R.C. § 751(a) (2012).
34 Id.
35 I.R.C. § 721 (2012).
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on the appreciation of assets while the partnership is operating.36 A
partner is only taxed on the appreciation of the partnership’s assets
when that partner leaves the partnership.37
But there is a discrepancy: when the partner sells her interest in
the partnership (and is taxed on the appreciation of partnership
assets), the partnership does not usually sell those appreciated
assets. Put differently, the buying partner’s basis in her partnership
interest (outside basis) likely will differ from the partnership’s basis
in the partner’s share of assets (inside basis). To counteract this
discrepancy, the Code typically allows a partnership to “step-up” its
basis in appreciated assets if a new partner joins the partnership.38
This step-up basis allows a buying partner’s outside basis to equal
her share of the partnership’s inside basis.39
To illustrate, take a simple example: in year 1, assume A and B
decide to each contribute $50 to a partnership called AB. After 5
years, B sells her interest in the partnership to C. At the time of
sale, AB was worth $200. While B’s inside and outside basis at the
time of sale was $50,40 C’s outside basis is $100 after the time of
sale. Because C steps into B’s inside basis at the time of sale, C’s
inside basis is only $50. To counter this discrepancy, AB makes an
election to revalue C’s basis. C would then have an inside basis of
$100 and would get the benefit of the extra $50 of basis.
If B does not pay tax when it sells the partnership interest, the
United States has effectively lost its ability to tax the full
appreciation of the partnership’s assets. Because C’s basis is
stepped up to $100, she gets credit for the $50 asset appreciation
without paying U.S. tax. Although that gain is only $50 in our
example, the United States could lose millions of dollars in revenue
if it is unable to tax these appreciated assets. This situation gets
more complicated when the selling partner is a nonresident.

Id.
I.R.C. § 741 (2012).
38 I.R.C. §§ 743(b), 754 (2012). See LAURA E. CUNNINGHAM & NOEL B. CUNNINGHAM, THE
LOGIC OF SUBCHAPTER K: A CONCEPTUAL GUIDE TO THE TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS 200 (5th
ed. 2017) (noting that the effect of a § 754 election and corresponding § 743(b) adjustment “is
to treat the purchasing partners as if she had purchased an undivided interest in each asset”).
39 See I.R.C. §§ 743(b), 754 (2012) (discussing the effects of the stepped-up basis).
40 Assuming, for simplicity, that the partnership does not have other inside and outside
basis differences, or any income or loss in the intervening years.
36
37
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B. WHEN IS A NONRESIDENT SUBJECT TO U.S. TAXATION?

Nonresident citizens are not subject to taxation in the United
States unless an explicit statutory exception imposes a tax on the
individual.41 Nonresidents42 are not subject to U.S. taxation on their
foreign source income.43 And under the default rule, a seller sources
the gain from a sale of personal property to her country of
residence.44 One exception45 to the default rule is that a nonresident
is subject to U.S. tax if (1) the nonresident has income derived from
a U.S. trade or business; (2) that income is U.S. sourced; and (3) the
income is “effectively connected income” (ECI).46 This discussion
will explain these three separate and nuanced concepts.47
1. Does the Nonresident Have a U.S. Trade or Business?
First, the nonresident taxpayer must have a U.S. trade or
business.48 The test for whether a nonresident is engaged in a “U.S.
trade or business” is comparable to the test for personal jurisdiction,
effectively asking whether the “taxpayer availed himself of the
privileges of business activity within the borders of the United
States under the protection of its laws to such a degree that the
taxpayer should help pay for those privileges and that protection.”49
The analysis for this Note is straight-forward: being a partner in a
U.S. partnership is enough to say that the partner has a U.S. Trade
41 See David L. Forst, The U.S. International Tax Treatment of Partnerships: A PolicyBased Approach, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 239, 241 (1996) (“Through whatever prism
international tax policy is viewed, there is a general international consensus that income
earned in a source country by a resident of a different country should not be subject to double
taxation, or more precisely, should not be taxed fully by both countries.”). This is different
from the general presumption for U.S. citizens that the individual has gross income “from
whatever source derived” unless there is a statute that states otherwise. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012).
42 I.R.C. § 7701(b)(1)(B) (2012).
43 I.R.C. § 871(i) (2012).
44 I.R.C. § 865(a) (2012).
45 Another exception is when a nonresident who spends over 183 days in the U.S. sells
personal property. In that case, the nonresident will be subject to U.S. taxation. I.R.C. §
871(a)(2) (2012).
46 I.R.C. § 872(b)(2) (2012).
47 See Alfred H. Bae, My Big Fat Grecian Divorce: A Labyrinthine Tale of ECI, 47 TAX
MGMT. INT. J. 390 (June 8, 2018) (using a similar structure to discuss whether a taxpayer has
ECI).
48 I.R.C. § 872(b)(2) (2012).
49 See 2 Rhoades & Langer, U.S. INT’L TAX’N & TAX TREATIES § 28.03 (2017) (citing
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945))).
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or Business.50 Nonresidents that invest in a foreign partnership
engaged in a U.S. trade or business would, by being a partner in
that partnership, be engaged in a U.S. trade or business and would
be subject to U.S. tax on ECI from the partnership.51 Put another
way, “the partnership’s U.S. trade or business will be attributed to
the foreign partners.”52
2. Does the U.S. Trade or Business Have U.S. Sourced Income?
Second, the U.S. trade or business must have U.S. source
income.53 Generally, when a nonresident sells personal property
(e.g., a partnership interest), that sale is sourced outside the United
States.54 There is an exception to this general rule—where the
partnership interest would be U.S. sourced income—under the socalled “U.S. Office Rule.” 55 The U.S. Office Rule applies if (a) the
taxpayer has a U.S. office or fixed place of business, (b) that office is
“a material factor in the production of such income, gain, or loss”
(material factor test), and (c) that “office or fixed place of business
regularly carries on activities of the type from which such income,
gain, or loss is derived” (regular activities test).56 Note that this is a
“conjunctive ‘and’ test” so that all three conditions must be met.57
3. Is the U.S. Sourced Income ECI?
Finally, the U.S. source income must also be ECI under § 864(c).
Although there may be other forms of ECI, this Note will focus on
only one: when a nonresident has gain attributable to a U.S. office
or fixed place of business.58 Relevant to this discussion is § 864(c)(2),
which provides that U.S. sourced gain will be ECI if the gain is
attributable to a U.S. office or fixed place of business according to
I.R.C. § 875(1) (2012).
See Unger v. Comm’r, 936 F.2d 1316, 1320 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (holding that a taxpayer’s
“limited partnership interest” created “a permanent establishment in the United States”).
52 Bae, supra note 47.
53 I.R.C. § 872(b)(2).
54 I.R.C. § 865(a) (2012).
55 I.R.C. § 865(e)(2) (2012). See I.R.C. § 865(e)(3) (2012) (noting that the “[t]he principles
of section 864(c)(5)” apply for purposes of determining gain attributable to a U.S. office).
56 I.R.C. § 864(c)(5)(B) (2012).
57 Bae, supra note 47.
58 This Note will not focus on “FDAP” income under I.R.C. §871(a) (2012), as that statute
was not at issue in the GMM case. GMM, 149 T.C. No. 3 at 13. Instead, this Note will focus
on ECI under I.R.C. § 871(b) (2012).
50
51
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either the “asset-use test” or the “business activities test.”59 The
asset-use test is satisfied when the income derives from an asset
used in a U.S. trade or business.60 The business activities test is
satisfied when the activity of the U.S. trade or business is “a
material factor in the realization of the income.”61
Although this test looks similar to the U.S. Office Rule, it imposes
different obligations on the inbound investor. This part of the
analysis is tricky and was the subject of confusion even with the
GMM court.62 Even if the gain is classified as U.S. source under the
U.S. Office Rule, the partner may not have ECI income or the ECI
income amount may differ from the amount of U.S. source gain. It
is at least theoretically possible that the analysis under either the
U.S. Office Rule or the ECI test may diverge. While the U.S. Office
Rule focuses on the activities of the office in question (i.e., whether
the Office is a material factor in a type of income that the business
regularly earns),63 the ECI test focuses on assets and activities from
which the business earns its income. Such a subtle distinction may
be normatively unnecessary, but taxpayers still need to go through
both tests to comply with the law.

I.R.C. § 864(c)(2) (2012).
Id. See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.864-4(c)(2) - (iv)(b) (“[There is a rebuttable presumption] that
an asset will be treated as held in direct relationship to the U.S. trade or business if 1) the
asset was acquired with funds generated by that trade or business, 2) The income from the
asset is retained or reinvested in that trade or business, and 3) personnel who are present in
the United States and actively involved in the conduct of that trade or business exercise
significant management and control over the investment of such asset.”).
61 I.R.C. § 864(c)(2) (2012). See Treas. Reg. §1.864-4(c)(3) (“[T]he business-activities test
shall ordinarily apply in making a determination with respect to income, gain, or loss which,
even though generally of the passive type, arises directly from the active conduct of the
taxpayer's trade or business in the United States. The business-activities test is of primary
significance, for example, where . . . (b) gain or loss is derived from the sale or exchange of
capital assets in the active conduct of a trade or business by an investment company.”).
62 See Bae, supra note 47 (noting that “the Tax Court itself misunderstood” a particularly
confusing sourcing provision—whether the income was FDAP income, under § 871(a)(1), or
whether it was ECI income that would potentially be “FDAP if it were not effectively
connected with a U.S. trade or business”).
63 See Kimberly Blanchard, What Is the Government’s Appeal in ‘Grecian’ About?, 47 TAX
MGMT. INT’L J. 546, 547 (Aug. 10, 2018) (“This [U.S. Office Rule test] is a high bar, and was
intended as such. . . . A foreign person could have a U.S. office engaged in nothing but
accounting, with all sales being made through an office outside the United States, and that
would not be enough to cause the sales income to be sourced to the United States. Moreover,
even if the U.S. office did everything necessary to cause the sale to occur, it won’t be enough
to find U.S.-source income unless the office does that regularly.).
59
60
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4. Invest via Blocker Corporations?
Most nonresidents are able to avoid this convoluted analysis by
investing in U.S. partnerships through a “blocker corporation.”64 In
this scenario, the foreign resident makes a contribution in a newly
formed U.S. or foreign corporation, which will invest directly into
the U.S. partnership.65 The main advantage of this structure is that
the nonresident can avoid filing a U.S. tax return.66 Most foreign
investors structure their investments so they can avoid filing a U.S.
tax return.67
But nonresidents face significant drawbacks to using this blocker
structure. During the operating life of the partnership, the
nonresident “will bear the full economic burden” of “two levels of
tax, first at the corporate-level on their allocable share of the
operating income . . . [from the] partnership and second at the
shareholder level on any dividends received from the Blocker.”68 If
the nonresident sells his partnership interest directly to a buying
partner, the nonresident will likewise face two levels of tax.69 The
nonresident can avoid the double layer of taxation associated with
selling the partnership interest by selling the “[b]locker shares” to
the buying partner. The buying partner, however, would likely pay
less for these shares as “the sale will not convey a basis step-up in
the portfolio company assets to the buyer.”70

64 See id. (“To avoid having to file a U.S. tax return and, where the foreign person is a
corporation, to avoid becoming subject to the branch tax, most foreign persons invest in
operating partnerships through U.S. corporations (often referred to as ‘‘blockers’’)); Gregg D.
Polsky & Adam H. Rosenzweig, The Up-C Revolution, 71 TAX L. REV. 415, 440 (2018)
(“Typically, when private investment funds (for example, VC/PE funds) own interests in an
LLC, a ‘blocker’ corporation will be inserted into the ownership structure to protect the fund's
tax-exempt and foreign investors from realizing unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) or
effectively connected income (ECI), respectively.”).
65 See, e.g., Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 64, at 440.; Omri Marian, The Other Eighty
Percent: Private Investment Funds, International Tax Avoidance, and Tax-Exempt Investors,
2016 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1715, 1731 (2016) (noting that foreign investors prefer investing through
a blocker structure to prevent risk of having ECI).
66 Polsky & Rosenzweig, supra note 64, at 440.
67 See Barbara C. Spudis et al., Using Partnerships in International Tax Planning, 73
TAXES 834, 854 (1995) (noting “the seemingly minor concern” of U.S. filing obligations on
nonresidents “may be a deciding factor in the structuring decision”).
68 Andrew W. Needham, Private Equity Funds, 735 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) U.S. Income, at
VIII.D (last visited Jan. 20, 2019).
69 Id.
70 Id.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

13

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 10

814

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:801

5. The Intersection of Partnership and International Taxation
A simple example illustrates why partnership theory is relevant
to our international taxation question and why the government
cares about the intersection of the two. Assume that a nonresident
disposes of her partnership interest in a U.S. partnership that only
holds assets and conducts business within the United States.
Applying the aggregate theory, the partnership, as an
aggregation of its partners, would compute the gain or loss based on
the unrealized gain or loss in the underlying partnership assets.
The selling partner would need to recognize gain in the same way
as if the partnership had sold assets to another party. This result
follows because (a) the partner has a trade or business; (b) that sale
is likely U.S. source income under the U.S. Office Rule because the
partnership is a material factor in that gain (assuming, for example,
the Office negotiated the terms of the sale) and is a regular activity
of the partnership (assuming that the partnership regularly buys
and sells assets in its normal course of business); and (c) that the
gain is ECI because the asset is used in the U.S. partnership.
If the partner sold a 25% share in the partnership, the
partnership would act as if it liquidated 25% of each asset. The
selling partner would recognize gain or loss equal to the combined
gain or loss from each asset. The nonresident would then need to
pay U.S. tax because the gain is ECI. But if the nonresident did not
want to go through the convoluted ECI analysis, the nonresident
could have invested through a blocker corporation and sold the
corporate stock directly to the buying partner.
Applying the entity theory would lead to the opposite result. The
partnership would be treated as an entity separate and distinct
from its partners, like a corporation. As the next part shows, it is
textually difficult under an entity theory to argue that the gain is
U.S. sourced income or ECI. The default sourcing rule would apply,
and the gain would be sourced based on the residence of the
partner.71 That partner would then escape U.S. taxation if she was
a nonresident.

71

See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
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III. ENTITY-AGGREGATE THEORY
Notably missing in Part II was any statutory authority that
governs our quandary of whether a nonresident who sells or
redeems his interest in a U.S. partnership for a gain should pay U.S.
tax on that gain. While the broad principles underlying
international and partnership taxation provide some guidance,
those statutes stop short of providing a definite answer to this
problem.72 From a policy perspective, it seems like the government
should prevent the nonresident’s “asset appreciation from escaping
taxation.”73 But tax lawyers prefer to interpret statutes textually
and give little weight to arguments of fairness or policy.74
Congress enacted § 864(b)(8) to solve the foreign partner, entityaggregate problem in a new way. Others, including practitioners,
the Treasury, and the GMM court, also offered solutions to this
problem. A close look at the different approaches yields insights into
the benefits and drawbacks of each solution. At bottom, each of the
pre-TCJA approaches was flawed, and § 864(b)(8) has not mended
those flaws. Drawing on these insights, Part IV will offer a better
solution.

72 See GMM, 149 T.C. at 35 (“There is no Code section that specifically provides the source
of a foreign partner’s income from the sale or liquidation of its interest in a partnership.”);
Christopher Trump & Mark Graham, In Search of a Normative Theory of Partnership
Taxation for International Tax (Or How We Learned to Stop Worrying and Love Subchapter
K), in The Partnership Tax Practice Series: Planning for Domestic and Foreign Partnerships,
LLCs, Joint Ventures & Other Strategic Alliances (Practicing Law Inst. 2d ed. 2017), at 27825, reprinted in 93 TAXES 143 (March 2015) (“Thus, there is very little if any direct guidance
on the treatment of the gain or loss recognized at the partner level on the sale or exchange of
the partnership interest.”).
73 See infra part IV.D.1; see also Tyler A. LeFevre, Justice in Taxation, 41 VT. L. REV. 763,
786–87 (2017) (“Practitioners reach different conclusions on this issue: the language of
relevant tax law and foreign tax law of partnership interests lead to one conclusion, while the
United States’ general tax policy preventing asset appreciation from escaping taxation leads
to another conclusion.”).
74 But see LeFevre, supra note 73, at 787 (advocating for tax lawyers to use more policy
arguments when interpreting statutes with the understanding that right now, it is “taboo for
a technical memorandum, judicial opinion, or tax authority ruling to deal with issues of
justice”).

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

15

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 10

816

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:801

A. PRACTITIONER PRESUMPTION

There is no “unifying entity or aggregate theme” of partnership
taxation.75 While this lack of a theme may seem innocuous, it
creates a tremendous amount of “uncertainty.”76 Scholars have
yearned to fix this uncertainty,77 yet no clear answers are in sight.
In absence of any unifying theme, practitioners have stepped in to
fill the theoretical inconsistency built into the Code by presuming
the entity theory applies. But, as this section explores, this
practitioner presumption may contravene current law.
1. Practitioner Presumption of Entity Theory
Most practitioners argue that, absent any explicit statutory
override, the entity theory should apply when a partner sells or
redeems his partnership interest.78 This presumption is not found
in the Code,79 but is derived from a type of Congressional intent. Put
differently, although Congress has not explicitly said there is an
entity presumption, some argue it has legislatively enacted such a
presumption through the statutes it creates.
Practitioners base their entity presumption argument on two
premises. First, § 741 provides the general rule of partnership
disposition. That section states that a sale of a partnership interest
is considered a sale of a capital asset (not assets), which seems to
suggest that an entity approach is more appropriate.80 Second,
75 See McKee, supra note 15, at ¶1.02[3] (“The absence of a unifying entity or aggregate
theme in the statute means that these situations must be resolved on an ad hoc basis by
reference to the way in which the statute applies the entity and aggregate concepts to related
or analogous situations—a process that is difficult, tedious, and uncertain.”).
76 Id. at ¶1.02[3] (noting that the “blending of aggregate and entity concepts is one of the
primary sources of uncertainty in the interpretation and application of Subchapter K”).
77 See, e.g., Bradley T. Borden, Aggregate-Plus Theory of Partnership Taxation, 43 GA. L.
REV. 717, 773 (2009) (arguing that the tax community should adopt an “aggregate-plus”
approach—which presumes the aggregate approach unless there is an explicit statutory
provision that overrides the presumption—because it would “promote[] economic efficiency
and allocate[] partnership tax items accurately,” unlike our current “entity-minus” approach).
78 See McKee, supra note 15, at ¶1.02[3]. The Tax Court favorably cited to McKee’s treatise
in its opinion. Grecian Magnesite Mining, Indus. & Shipping Co. v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. No. 3,
at 16 (2017), appeal docketed, No. 19215-12 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2017), partially superseded by
statute, I.R.C. § 864(c)(8) (2018).
79 Some commentators have argued that such a statement would be very beneficial. See
McKee, supra note 15, at ¶1.02[3] (noting that “a simple statement . . . would go a long way
toward resolving many of the difficult problems discussed” in partnership taxation).
80 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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practitioners stress that Congress has sub silenco adopted the
practitioner presumption. Congress knows about this presumption,
and, when it disagrees with the results that the entity theory
provides in a particular situation, Congress chooses to legislatively
fix the abuses via an aggregate-type statute. If Congress chooses not
to adopt an aggregate-type statute, the practitioner view is that
entity theory controls.
Two aggregate-type statutes seem to confirm that Congress
knows how to fix entity-type statutes when it sees there is a
potential abusive situation. First, § 751(b) requires that a
partnership look through to its assets to determine a disposing
partner’s share of cash or cash-like assets.81 The partner then must
pay tax at an ordinary rate for its §751(b) gain, and at a capital
gains rate for the rest of the gain. This section has been described
as a “super-aggregate” Code section because the section recalculates
types of income and loss normally calculated using the entity theory
as if the type of income and loss were calculated using the aggregate
theory.82 Second, Congress requires partnerships to use the
aggregate approach to calculate its gain under § 897(g), which
requires non-residents to pay tax on the portion of gain attributable
to U.S. real property.83 Yet, there is a reasonable argument that
some commentators have misconstrued the aggregate and entity
debate.84
2. Practitioner Presumption is not Supported by Current Law.
A passage from a 1954 House Report shows that the Congress
did not intend for the entity presumption to exist.85 In the report,
Congress added an explanation in the House Report to § 707, which
uses an entity approach to decide when a partnership has entered a
transaction with its partner. The report stated:

See Blanchard, supra note 17.
Id.
83 I.R.C. § 897(g) (2012).
84 In the process, it is likely that practitioners have engaged in “planning drift”—a process
whereby practitioners shape law by using their interpretation in transactions, leaving the
IRS hamstrung to challenge the interpretation after the fact. See Sloan G. Speck, Tax
Planning and Policy Drift, 69 TAX L. REV. 549, 551 (2016) (“The Wall Street Rule provides
one vehicle through which private actors and their expert advisors influence public policy by
‘creat[ing] law through their own practices.’” (alteration in original)).
85 H.R. REP. NO. 2543, at 59 (1954) (Conf. Rep.).
81
82
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Both the House provisions and the Senate amendment
provide for the use of the “entity” approach in the
treatment of the transactions between a partner and a
partnership which are described above. No inference is
intended, however, that a partnership is to be
considered as a separate entity for the purpose of
applying other provisions of the internal revenue laws
if the concept of the partnership as a collection of
individuals is more appropriate for such provisions.86
But that section is not helpful because it does not say who gets
to decide what is “more appropriate”: should the taxpayer, the IRS,
or the courts decide?87 And when can a statute be interpreted in a
“more appropriate” way? Even if Congress did not intend for an
entity presumption to exist, the passage creates more questions
than it answers.
Congress also touched on the issue when it added § 897(g) to the
Code. That section took an aggregate approach to ensure that
nonresidents pay tax on the portion of the gain attributable to the
partnership’s U.S. real estate. The House Report associated with
the statute stated:
[T]o impose tax on gains from the sale of U.S. real
estate, it is also necessary to impose a similar tax on
gain from the disposition of interests in entities which
hold substantial U.S. real property. Otherwise, a
foreign investor could, as under present law, avoid tax
on the gain by holding the real estate through a
corporation, partnership, or trust and disposing of his

86 Id. (emphasis added); see also Monte A. Jackel, Aggregate and Entity in the Partnership
World, 136 TAX NOTES TODAY 559, 559 (Jul. 30, 2012) (discussing the relevance of the report
on the aggregate and entity debate).
87 See id.at 569 (“I do not believe that any consistent theory of what is ‘appropriate’ can be
derived from [the legislative history of other statutes]. If I am correct, then predicting the
results of any situation is a matter of making the best guess at the most appropriate tax
policy result. After almost 60 years of the existence of subchapter K, that should not be the
case.”).
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interest in that entity rather than having the entity itself
sell the real estate.88
With that report, Congress did two things. First, it suggested
that the entity approach presumption was appropriate not just for
partnership tax issues, but also for international tax issues.89
Without applying the entity approach to international sourcing
provisions, § 897(g) would be “superfluous.”90 Second, because the
legislative language was from 1980, far later than the 1954 report
described above, Congress may have changed its stance on the
entity and aggregate debate. If Congress believed that a
presumption did not exist, it would have concluded that the IRS
could collect tax on the dispositions of U.S. real estate held in a
partnership and would not have enacted § 897(g). And if Congress
did not believe that such a presumption was appropriate, it could
have clarified through legislation that no presumption existed.
But practitioners may be attributing too much to this language;
Congress may not have presumed as much. Maybe Congress tried
to enact statutes to address discrete issues, hoping only to affect a
small sliver of the Code. Section 751 changes the character of the
gain, but does not discuss when a gain must be included in the ambit
of U.S. taxation. It has a much broader reach than § 741. And §
897(g) may have targeted a particular type of foreign investor
driving up real estate prices in the 1980s; perhaps it was enacted
for “xenophobic” non-tax reasons.91 Congress may not have wanted
to answer the entity-aggregate question in more general terms.
Perhaps Congress even thought it was “superfluous,” but wanted
to enact the legislation anyway to ensure that foreigners, who may
88 H.R. REP. NO. 1167, at 511 (1980) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5526,
5874 (emphasis added).
89 See Staffaroni, supra note 22, at 91 n.168 (noting that the “language in the legislative
history of section 897(g) suggests that the general entity rule of section 741 applies outside
Subchapter K to a foreign partner’s sale of a-partnership interest”).
90 Grecian Magnesite Mining, Indus. & Shipping Co. v. Comm’r, 146 T.C. No. 3, at 27
(2017), appeal docketed, No. 19215-12 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2017), partially superseded by
statute, I.R.C. § 864(c)(8) (2018).
91 Richard L. Kaplan, Creeping Xenophobia and the Taxation of Foreign-Owned Real
Estate, 71 GEO. L.J. 1091, 1128 (1983) (noting that the stated goal of § 897 to reduce
“horizontal inequity” between nonresidents and U.S. residents selling real estate was
“spurious” and that the actual intention of the statute was “to discourage foreign investment
in United States real estate”).
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be harder to track down than U.S. citizens, pay tax on their share
of income derived from U.S. real estate. Congressional intent is
much less clear than it seems, especially when Congress enacted
most of the international tax code sections after the 1954 Act. And
without this congressional intent, the practitioner entity
presumption argument falls on its head. While the presumption
may help guide practitioners in areas of uncertainty, it is unjustified
given current law.
B. REV. RUL. 91-32: THE IRS APPLIES THE QUASI-AGGREGATE THEORY

With Congress’s mixed signals, the IRS tried to answer the
entity-aggregate question in Rev. Rul. 91-32. The guidance contains
three fact patterns, two of which relate to this Note.92 In the first
fact pattern, a nonresident individual owns an interest in a U.S.
partnership.93 That partnership “owns appreciated personal
property . . . that is used [in the partnership’s] trade or business
within the United States.”94 In the second fact pattern, the
partnership, besides owning appreciated personal property in the
United States, also owns machinery and real property outside of the
country.95 In both scenarios, the foreign partner disposed of her
partnership interest. 96
As Part II explained, there are three requirements to tax a
foreign partner disposing of his interest: (1) a nonresident needs a
U.S. trade or business; (2) the income derived needs to be U.S.
sourced from a U.S. office under both the material factor and
regular activities test; and (3) the U.S. sourced income needs to be
ECI under either the asset-use or business activities test. The IRS
concluded that these three prongs were met in both scenarios.
First, although the IRS did not explicitly state that a U.S.
partnership creates a U.S. trade or business for foreign partners

92 The third fact pattern explains how Rev. Rul. 91-32 applies when a resident is a member
of a country with a tax treaty with the United States. As noted above, this Note will not focus
on the implications of Rev. Rul. 91-32 from a tax treaty perspective.
93 Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875.
94 Id.
95 Id.
96 Id.
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who invest in that partnership, it relied on that assumption. The
Code establishes this bright line.97
Second, the IRS explained that the partnership’s activities would
be classified as U.S. sourced income. The IRS began its analysis by
acknowledging that a partnership interest is personal property,
which will only be taxable in the United States under the U.S. Office
Rule, § 865(e)(2).98 The IRS then explained:
Income from the disposition of a partnership interest by
the foreign partner will be attributable to the foreign
partner's fixed place of business in the United States.
See section 865 (e)(3); cf. Unger v. Commissioner, T.C.
Memo 1990-15 . . . . By virtue of its interest in the
partnership, the foreign partner is considered to be
engaged in a trade or business through the
partnership's fixed place of business in the United
States. Moreover, the value of the trade or business
activity of the partnership affects the value of the
foreign partner's interest in the partnership.
Consequently, an interest in a partnership that is
engaged in a trade or business through a fixed place of
business in the United States is an ECI asset of a
foreign partner.99
But there is a fatal flaw in the IRS’s rationale: it never discussed
the material factor or regular activities test of the U.S. Office
Rule.100 To many commentators, the IRS simply stated a tautology
that “[i]ncome from the disposition . . . will be attributable to the
foreign partner’s fixed place of business.”101 Under § 865(e)(2), the
partnership would be subject to U.S. tax if, under the “principles of
§ 864(c)(5)”102—that is, if the disposition is a material factor and the
See supra note 51.
Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875.
99 Id.
100 See Bae, supra note 47, at 393 (“The lack of adequate treatment of the U.S. Office Rule
is Rev. Rul. 91-32’s greatest shortcoming.”).
101 Blanchard, supra note 17 (citing Unger v. Comm’r, 936 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1991))
(emphasis removed); see also id. (“Rev. Rul. 91-32 never discussed or applied the principles of
Section 864(c)(5). Instead, the ruling found the partner’s gain to be U.S.-sourced gain based
solely on the tautological statement quoted above.” (emphasis removed)).
102 I.R.C. § 865(e)(3) (2012).
97
98
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activities from which the income derives regularly occurs—that
partnership has U.S. sourced gain. And the IRS’s cite to Unger was
similarly unpersuasive, as that case concerned whether a
partnership’s distributive share was ECI, not whether a
partnership’s gain on disposition was U.S. sourced.103
The IRS did not apply either the aggregate or entity theory in
this part of the analysis; it did something much more novel. Kim
Blanchard, in her seminal 1997 paper on the Revenue Ruling, said
that the IRS took an “attributional” approach to the problem.104 She
said that the Code “expressly attribute[s] certain activities of a
partnership to its partners for purposes of characterizing a partner’s
distributive share income,” that is, the partner “step[s] into the
shoes of the partnership.”105 Blanchard defined the “aggregate”
approach as “an undivided interest in the partnership’s assets and
liabilities.”106 This distinction is critical: if Rev. Rul. 91-32 was a
pure aggregate approach, the taxpayer would still need to source
and characterize the nature of every asset according to §§ 864 &
865. Rev. Rul. 91-32 instead attributed the activities of the
partnership to the partner.107
Third, the IRS explained that the U.S. sourced income may
partially be ECI. The agency said that “certain gain or loss from
sources within the [United States] from the sale or exchange of a
capital asset is gain that is” ECI if the gain qualifies under the
either-or asset-use or business activities test in § 864(c)(2).108 The
IRS then summarily asserted that because “the value of the trade
or business activity of the partnership affects the value of the
foreign partner's interest in the partnership,” this gain was ECI.109

103 See Blanchard, supra note 17 (“The citation to Unger was pointless, since that case did
not involve the sale of personal property by the foreign partner . . . .”).
104 Blanchard, supra note 17 (“[Rev. Rul. 91-32] represents a truly unprecedented
application of attributional principles not sanctioned or event suggested by any provision of
the code.”).
105 Id. (alterations added).
106 Id.
107 Blanchard further reasoned that a 1991 Private Letter Ruling, which involved the same
issue except in the S Corporation context, added credence to her analysis. See id. (“If Rev.
Rul. 91-32 can logically be extended to S corporations, the authority for the ruling must be
derived from some rule independent of [partnership] aggregate theory.” (citing I.R.S. Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 91-42-032 (Oct. 18, 1991), 1991 WL 778337)).
108 Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875.
109 Id.
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But to make matters even more confusing, although the IRS used
an attributable approach for the U.S. sourced test, it applied the
aggregate method for calculating the ECI.110 The IRS explained:
[I]n applying sections 864(c) and 865(e) of the Code, it is
appropriate to treat a foreign partner’s disposition of its
interest in a partnership that is engaged in a trade or
business through a fixed place of business in the United
States as a disposition of an aggregate interest in the
partnership’s underlying property for purposes of
determining the source and ECI character of the gain or
loss realized by the foreign partner.111
Instead of engaging in the language in §§ 864 and 865, the IRS
simply concluded that it had the power to use the aggregate theory
in any situation according to the legislative history of § 707.112 But
the legislative history only said that Congress expressed no view on
whether the entity or the aggregate theory was more appropriate in
a situation, not that the IRS had the authority to determine what
was more appropriate. Even if it had the power, the IRS gave no
reasons to support why the holding was the “more appropriate”
result. It did not explain why the aggregate theory was more
appropriate to interpret the principles of § 864, nor did it address
the general entity presumption when considering dispositions of
partnership interests. Some commentators note this “application of
the asset use test lacked precision” and was not persuasive.113
The IRS concluded that the nonresident individual would have
ECI “to the extent that the partner’s distributive share of unrealized
gain or loss of the partnership would be attributable to ECI . . .
property of the partnership.”114 The guidance went one step further,
creating a presumption that gain would be ECI and loss would not

110 Blanchard, supra note 17 (“[T]he IRS in Rev. Rul. 91-32 became so uncomfortable with
its . . . strained analysis . . . [that it] revered to what it conceived of as the policy underlying
the AGGREGATE theory of partnership taxation” to determine the amount of gain.”
(emphasis in original)).
111 Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875 (emphasis added).
112 See Jackel, supra note 86, at 569 (describing the IRS’s broad claim to interpretive
authority).
113 Bae, supra note 47.
114 Rev. Rul. 91-32, 1991-1 C.B. 107, 1991 WL 734875.
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be ECI “unless the partner is able to produce . . . information . . .
showing the distributive share of net ECI and net non-ECI gain or
loss . . . would have been allocated if the partnership sold all of its
assets.”115
In 2012, the IRS doubled down on the approach articulated in
Rev. Rul. 91-32 in a field advice memorandum.116 A year after,
however, the Obama administration asked for a codification of Rev.
Rul. 91-32.117 The Treasury and IRS also included the regulation in
their priority guidance plan for the 2016-2017 tax year.118 Without
stating it, the Treasury likely realized that it needed explicit
statutory or regulatory authority to implement Rev. Rul. 91-32.119
C. GMM: TAX COURT APPLIES THE ENTITY THEORY

The GMM Court did not agree with the IRS’s view on the entityaggregate debate and refused to give any deference to the IRS’s
interpretation.120 The court all but eviscerated the power of the
revenue ruling, stating that Rev. Rul. 91-32
is not simply an interpretation of the IRS’s own
ambiguous regulations, and we find that it lacks the
power to persuade. Its treatment of the partnership
provisions discussed above . . . is cursory in the extreme,
not even citing section 731 (which, as we set out, yields
a conclusion of “gain or loss from the sale or exchange
Id.
2012 IRS NSAR 3903F, 2012 WL 12093537 (July 17, 2012) (rejecting a taxpayer’s
protest of Rev. Rul. 91-32 and application of the entity theory to sourcing by reasoning that
“the rules governing the sale of partnership interests should be interpreted in light of the
purposes and policies of I.R.C. §§ 864(c) and 865(e)”).
117 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL
YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 96 (Feb. 2012).
118 DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2016–2017 PRIORITY GUIDANCE PLAN, at 15 (Aug. 2016). The
Treasury and the IRS, however, did not include the project on the priority guidance plan prior
to the enactment of TCJA. See generally DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 2017–2018 PRIORITY
GUIDANCE PLAN (Oct. 2017).
119 See Bae, supra note 47 (noting some commentators construed “attempts by the Obama
Administration to codify Rev. Rul. 91-32” as “the government's tacit acknowledgement that
the ruling itself rested on brittle reasoning that might not hold up to challenge in the absence
of a new statute”).
120 Grecian Magnesite Mining, Indus. & Shipping Co. v. Comm’r, 149 T.C. No. 3, at 34
(2017), appeal docketed, No. 19215-12 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2017), partially superseded by
statute, I.R.C. § 864(c)(8) (2018).
115
116
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of the partnership interest” (emphasis added)). The
ruling’s subchapter K analysis essentially begins and
ends with the observation that “[s]ubchapter K of the
Code is a blend of aggregate and entity treatment for
partners and partnerships.”121
By refusing to defer to the guidance, the court did not accept the
strained textual rationale in Rev. Rul. 91-32. Instead, it made its
own determination of “whether the disputed gain” was ECI.122
1. The GMM Holding
The GMM court analyzed how to characterize the sale of the
foreign partner’s interest in the partnership. It determined, based
on the entity theory, that the sale of a U.S. partnership interest was
a sale of an indivisible capital asset not a sale of capital assets,
meaning that the tax court believed that § 741 controlled which, as
discussed above, is an entity-theory type Code section.123 The court
based its reasoning on the general entity-level presumption as
articulated by many commentators.124
Next, the court said that the disputed gain would only be subject
to tax in the U.S. if the gain “fall[s] under an exception to the default
rule—namely, the [U.S. Office Rule] of section 865(e)(2)(A).”125 The
partnership income would satisfy the U.S. Office Rule if the
material factor and the regular activities test were both met.126
The IRS had two arguments for the material factor test; both of
which were rejected by the court. First, as in Rev. Rul 91-32,127 the
IRS argued under the aggregate theory “that [the taxpayer’s]
redemption of its partnership interest . . . was equivalent to [the
partnership] selling its underlying assets and distributing to each
partner its pro rata share of the proceeds.”128 The GMM court
rejected such an approach and said such a reading “would render

Id.
Id. at 35.
123 Id. at 23.
124 See supra Part III.A.
125 GMM, 149 T.C. at 36.
126 See supra Part II.B.
127 Notably, this argument does not rely on the “attributional” part of the Rev. Rul. 91-32
analysis. See Blanchard, supra note 17.
128 GMM, 149 T.C. at 39.
121
122
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superfluous sections 751 and 897(g), both of which presume a
contrary, ‘entity theory’ general rule to which sections 751 and
897(g) are ‘aggregation theory’ exceptions.”129 The GMM court also
said that the IRS’s argument contradicted § 731(a), which
unequivocally used “a [singular] capital asset” to describe the sale
of a partnership interest.130
Second, the IRS argued that because the value of the partnership
interest went up as the value of the underlying assets increased, the
partnership’s “U.S. offices were an essential economic element in
[the taxpayer’s] realization of gain in the redemption.”131 The GMM
court disagreed, pointing to Treas. Reg. § 1.864-6(b)(2)(i), which
notes the material factor prong would not be realized “merely
because the office . . . [d]evelops, creates, produces, or acquires and
adds substantial value to, the property which is leased, licensed, or
sold, or exchanged.”132 The IRS argued that the Treasury regulation
addressed intangible property, not personal property. But the GMM
court rejected this argument because, in its view, no regulation was
directly on point in determining whether the gain was attributable
to the office, and thus the court should look to the “principles of
section 864(c)(5)” rather than dismissing the Treasury Regulation
for not being directly applicable to the facts at issue.133
The GMM court also dismissed the government’s argument that
the redemption satisfied the regular activities test. Even though
partners frequently buy and sell interests in partnerships, the
taxpayer argued that this redemption was a “one-time,
extraordinary event.”134 Although the IRS tried to convince the Tax
Court that this redemption was not an “isolated event,” the GMM
court said that the underlying partnership was “in the business of
producing and selling magnesite products, and therefore [the
taxpayer’s] gain realized on the redemption . . . was not realized in
the ordinary course of the trade or business carried on” by the
underlying partnership.135
Id.
Id. at 40.
131 Id. at 41.
132 Id. at 42 (quoting Treas. Reg. 1.864-6(b)(2)(i)) (emphasis removed).
133 Id. (emphasis omitted) (internal quotations omitted). Section 865(e)(3) directs the court
to look to “the principles of section 864(c)(5).” Id.
134 Id. at 45.
135 Id. at 46–47.
129
130
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The GMM court concluded its forty-seven-page discussion by
holding that the disputed gain was not ECI because the U.S. Office
Rule did not apply as the government failed to show that the sale
satisfied the material factor and the regular activities test. As the
default rule of § 865(a) applied, the sale of the partnership interest
was foreign sourced and not subject to U.S. taxation.136
2. The Abuse-of-Entity Rule
The GMM Court noted in a footnote that the IRS did not invoke
the abuse-of-entity rule.137 That rule allows the IRS to “treat a
partnership as an aggregate of its partners in whole or in part as
appropriate to carry out the purpose of any provision of the Internal
Revenue Code or the regulations promulgated thereunder.”138 The
IRS created the rule due to “the belief that significant potential for
abuse exists in the inappropriate treatment of a partnership as an
entity in applying rules outside of subchapter K to transactions
involving partnerships.”139
The IRS would have had been more likely to prevail if it had
raised the abuse-of-entity rule. The regulation is on point because
the IRS’s main argument was that it had the ability to say when the
aggregate method applied.140 And if a court aggreged that the IRS
has the ability to treat § 864 under the aggregate method, that court
would likely defer to the agency’s interpretation.141 The rule even
uses the same “as appropriate” language that the IRS used in Rev.
Rul. 91-32.142 But practitioners do not like this rule.143 The wording

136 Id. at 47. The Court also held that that the taxpayer was not liable for certain penalties
and additions to tax under I.R.C. § 6662(a) (2012) and I.R.C. §§ 6651(a)(1)–(2) (2012), id. at
2, but that discussion is not relevant to this Note.
137 Id. at 24 n.15. This rule, although promulgated within the more despised “anti-abuse
rule,” is not only targeted at abusive transactions but equally applies to non-abusive
transactions.
138 Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(e)(1) (emphasis added).
139 T.D. 8588, 60 FR 9776, 1995-1 C.B. 109.
140 But see Blanchard, supra note 17 (arguing that the abuse-of-entity rule would not work
in such a situation, because of the entity presumption in § 741).
141 See supra note 3.
142 See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143 See Andrea Monroe, What’s in a Name: Can the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule Really
Stop Partnership Tax Abuse?, 60 CASE W. RES. 401, 415–16 (2010) (noting that practitioners
described the proposed anti-abuse rule as the “greatest derogation of executive authority
since Watergate”; said “that the proposed regulation would cause ‘nuclear winter [to] descend

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2019

27

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 53, No. 2 [2019], Art. 10

828

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:801

of the rule is so broad it could apply to every transaction, even nonnefarious transactions.144 Perhaps as a reaction to the practitioner’s
aversion, the IRS rarely uses the rule to challenge a transaction,145
no court has favorably cited the rule in a holding,146 and
commentators have suggested these regulations exceed the
Treasury’s statutory authority.147 Some argue that the abuse-ofentity rule is practically “irrelevant.”148 But even if the rule is
irrelevant, why didn’t the IRS use the abuse-of-entity rule here?
The IRS had a few reasons for not raising the argument. First,
the IRS may have agreed with practitioners that the rule was too
broad to apply. Second, the IRS may have believed it was
inappropriate to raise the argument in GMM —where the foreign
taxpayer with unsophisticated tax counsel did not “intend” to
engage in any tax planning to circumvent the entity-aggregate
debate.149 Third, the IRS may have worried that the GMM court
would invalidate the abuse-of-entity rule.150 Even though the IRS
upon the joint venture profit-oriented partnership’”; and likened the rule “to a meat cleaver,
an atomic bomb, and a generally blunderbuss approach to rulemaking” (citations omitted)).
144 See, e.g., Emily Cauble & Gregg D. Polsky, The Problem of Abusive Related-Partner
Allocations, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 479, 501 (2014) (“[B]ecause it is a general standard, as opposed
to a technical rule, there will be significant litigation risk if the IRS were to challenge relatedpartner allocations by relying on the Partnership Anti-Abuse Rule.”); Jellum, infra note 147,
at 154 (noting that the rule is “unusual” because “it imposes an overarching standard on top
of subchapter K’s rules, and in doing so, it fundamentally changed existing law”).
145 See Monroe, supra note 143, at 433 (noting that the IRS has only challenged a
transaction in court under the rule twenty times).
146 Id. at 434.
147 See, e.g., McKee, supra note 15, at ¶1.05[6] (arguing that the regulations are invalid);
Linda D. Jellum, Dodging the Taxman: Why the Treasury’s Anti-Abuse Regulation is
Unconstitutional, 70 MIAMI L. REV. 152, 154 (2015) (same); James B. Sowell, The Partnership
Anti-Abuse Rules: Where Have We Been and Where are We Going, 89 TAXES 69 (2011) (same).
148 See Monroe, supra note 143, at 437.
149 Respondent’s Answering Brief at 136, GMM, 149 T.C. No. 3 (2017) (No. 19215-12), 2014
WL 10123471 (noting that the taxpayer’s tax preparer did not know about Rev. Rul. 91-32 or
§ 897(g) before the taxpayer filed its return).
150 See Sowell, supra note 147, at 93 (“It is interesting to note that one IRS official has
stated that he expects a ‘literalist judge’ may someday invalidate Reg. §1.701-2.” (citations
omitted)). Practitioners similarly believe the rule is invalid. See McKee, supra note 15, at
¶1.05[6] (“The abuse-of-entity-treatment rule, by contrast, lays out a general rule that
appears to stand rules of statutory interpretation on their head, but then applies the rule in
its examples in ways that seem obvious and clear. Like the abuse-of-Subchapter-K rule,
however, the abuse-of-entity-treatment rule represents a clear contradiction of the words and
intent of Congress.”); Sowell, supra note 147, at 91 (“Taxpayers have first argued that the
regulation violates the constitutionally required separation of powers since it attempts to
override both legislative and judicial powers.”).

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/10

28

Daily: Guidance Is Definitive, Reality Is Frequently Inaccurate: The Lin

2019]

LINGERING SAGA OF REV. RUL. 91-32

829

rarely uses the rule in court, the agency vigorously uses the rule in
audits and IRS appeals.151 Since this rule is fundamental to agency
proceedings, the IRS likely wanted to minimize its litigation risk.152
D. TCJA: CONGRESS APPLIES A LOOK-THROUGH APPROACH

After GMM, some argued that the decision would usher in a new
wave of inbound tax planning. Commentators argued that investing
through a corporate blocker would be unnecessary.153 That approach
was misguided. Although tax payments play a significant role in
any inbound structure, foreign investors likely care about U.S. filing
obligations and establishing a U.S. trade or business more than
paying tax on the gain.154 If a party can load up a blocker corporation
with debt or specially allocate tax and interest deductions to the
corporation, the corporate tax may be relatively small.155 And
nonresidents are not taxed on gains from sales of a corporate
blocker.156 But given the publicity surrounding the GMM decision,
some planners were already trying to change planning structures to
take advantage of the § 754 step-up.157 Without the statutory
change, planners would have pushed the envelope by engaging in
even more aggressive transactions.

151 See id. at 74 (noting that the IRS applied the rule at least 128 times in the appeals or
audit process between 1995 and 2007).
152 Raising the rule in only agency settings limits the IRS’s litigation risk because it is
unlikely that an IRS appeals judge will invalidate the rule.
153 Cf. David Sausen et al., United States: Grecian Magnesite Decision Could Have
Significant Tax Implications for Non-Us Investors In A US Fund, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING,
(Sept. 28, 2017) (“[The GMM] decision could have significant implications in the investment
fund context by opening up new structuring opportunities for [non-U.S.] investors.”).
154 See Elizabeth L. McGinley & Michele J. Alexander, Can Foreign Partners Now Exit
Partnerships Tax Free?, BRACEWELL (Aug. 3, 2017) (“[T]o the extent [investors] are investing
in partnerships engaging in U.S. trades or businesses, blocker corporations likely still will be
necessary to ‘block’ ultimate investors from being treated as being engaged in a U.S. trade or
business.”).
155 See DAVIS POLK & WARDWELL LLP, COURT HOLDS NON-U.S. INVESTOR IS NOT TAXABLE
ON SALE OF U.S. OPERATING PARTNERSHIP INTEREST (July 17, 2017) (noting that the firm
believed it “seems unlikely that [GMM] will affect the desire of Non-U.S. Investors to invest
in an Operating Partnership through a Blocker Corporation”).
156 I.R.C. § 865(a) (2012).
157 See infra Part IV.D.1; see also Lee Sheppard, Making Partnership Tax Safe for Foreign
Investors, 92 TAX NOTES TODAY 410 (Oct. 23, 2017) (discussing extremely aggressive
partnership planning opportunities that tax lawyers were publicly talking about at a bar
panel).
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In response to these potential abuses, Congress enacted
§ 864(c)(8) in the TCJA. As this section explains, the Congressional
response does not uniformly codify Rev. Rul. 91-32, nor does it apply
a pure aggregate or entity method to solving the problem. This new
approach comes with added compliance costs that outweigh the
benefits the statute provides.
1. Why Congress Needed to Act
Some commentators argue that GMM was not bad from a policy
perspective.158 That view is mistaken. The government should have
worried about at least one potentially abusive transaction after
GMM: nonresidents selling partnership interests and making § 754
elections. That potential result was the reason the Rev. Rul. 91-32,
while wrong from a technical perspective, gets to the correct policy
answer.159
If the United States does not tax a nonresident’s gain, it
effectively loses its ability to collect tax revenue from a
nonresident’s share of U.S. assets held in the partnership.160 The
lack of tax imposed on the selling partner and the § 743 basis
adjustment for the buying partner means that the U.S. cannot
collect tax from that U.S. partnership on the appreciation of its
assets. There is a lack of parity between a nonresident’s choice of
entity—the nonresident who held assets attributable to a U.S. trade
or business would be subject to U.S. taxation, but the nonresident
158 See Blanchard, supra note 17 (“To the extent Rev. Rul. 91-32 is justified on policy
grounds, it should apply equally to a selling partner who happens to be a domestic tax-exempt
organization. It is clear, however, that the ruling does not, and cannot, apply in that case.”);
Lucas M. Rachuba, Grecian Magnesite and the Rev. Rul. 91-32 Roller Coaster, 2017 TAX
NOTES TODAY 528 (Dec. 26, 2017) (“[I]t is not necessarily obvious that the result of Grecian
Magnesite offends any policy goals.”); Trump & Graham, supra note 72, at 278–30 (arguing
that although “all would acknowledge that” the U.S. “should be allowed to tax income that is
effectively connected with a trade or business,” Rev. Rul. 91-32 did not get to the right policy
answer because Congress already made “very specific . . . policy calls” about ECI in §§ 864
and 865). But see Bell & Shoemaker, supra note 17, at 80 (arguing that Rev. Rul. 91-32
“struggles laboriously to reach conclusions that are sound from a policy perspective”).
159 The Joint Committee on Taxation also cited § 754 in discussing why President Obama
was proposing a statute in 2012 that was substantially similar to § 864(c)(8). The report noted
that taxing the selling partner would be the “only opportunity for the United States to impose
tax on the unrealized appreciation of assets” if the partnership made an election under § 754.
See THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS
CONTAINED IN THE PRESIDENT’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET PROPOSAL 89 (June 2012)
[hereinafter JCT 2012 Report].
160 See supra Part II.A.
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who put those assets into a partnership would have avoided U.S.
taxation.
Some commentators argue this transaction already exists in the
domestic context with tax-exempt organizations.161 The government
also loses its ability to collect tax from gain attributable to a selling
tax-exempt partner. While there are similarities between the two
contexts, there are two essential differences. First, Congress
intentionally made exceptions for organizations that conduct
certain types of charitable activities.162 What has happened with the
taxation of the gain of nonresidents is the result of a haphazard
scheme rather than an intentional plan.
Second, the step-up is potentially more-abusive in the
nonresident context than for tax-exempt organizations because of
related-party transactions.163 To take advantage of the GMM result,
nonresidents would be incentivized to sell their interests to other
“related” U.S. entities or to create joint-ventures with U.S.
companies. The related buying entity would receive more basis
under § 743(a), minimizing the overall tax burden to the group.164
There is no similar incentive for a partnership to allocate to taxexempt entities because the partnership could not give away

161 See Blanchard, supra note 17 (noting that “[i]f a tax-exempt organization could sell, free
of tax, an interest in a partnership that had borrowed to acquire property, it could avoid the
tax that would be payable if the partnership had instead sold the debt-financed property”);
JCT 2012 Report, supra note 159 (discussing that Congress should “examine whether parity
between foreign persons and tax-exempt organizations is appropriate in enacting a
lookthrough approach to the taxation of the disposition of partnership interests”).
162 In fact, Blanchard acknowledged that Congress made a distinction “that normative
principles of tax law permit built-in, unrecognized gain to escape tax whenever a tax-exempt
entity sells appreciated property and the purchaser obtains a stepped-up basis.” Blanchard,
supra note 18. Although she referred to this to support her inapposite point, this reference
confirms that the Congress has recognized the distinction between tax-exempt entities and
nonresidents.
163 Cf. Cauble & Polsky, supra note 144, at 482–83 (discussing the substantial economic
effect partnership allocation, which “was designed only with arm's length partners in mind”
and therefore is a “pointless exercise” as applied to related-party allocations).
164 See id. at 494 (“But, in the context of related partners, the partners are effectively
different pockets of the same taxpayer. Therefore, the risk of making one partner worse off
will not result in any deterrent effect because the other related partner(s) would always
receive an equal and offsetting windfall.”). Additionally, if the buying entity was not related,
the two parties could negotiate the purchase price based on the value of the step-up. The
selling party could also insist on receiving a more income allocation, allowing the selling party
to receive part of the benefit of the step-up without giving up an economic right.
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taxable income without also giving up the economic right to that
property.165
Tax practitioners were envisioning even more abusive scenarios.
Planners were talking about using “splitter partnerships,” which
would siphon profits to avoid triggering a U.S. filing requirement
for nonresidents. 166 In this aggressive scenario, a nonresident would
invest directly into a U.S. partnership and the operating
partnership’s “agreement could be drafted to run operating profits
from a portfolio business through the partnership to the blocker but
allocate capital gains on the portfolio business assets directly to the
foreign investors without running them through the blocker.”167 The
nonresident would receive credit for the appreciation of the
partnership assets when it sells its interest, which would not be ECI
under GMM. This scenario would create the best of both worlds for
planners and investors: no filing requirement (no filing requirement
without ECI) and no U.S. tax (no ECI, no U.S. tax).168 Congress was
correct to shut down these potentially abusive transactions before it
became a problem.
2. Congressional Response in the TCJA
Buried deep within the TCJA, Congress—in its infinite wisdom—
enacted a provision to supersede the GMM decision. Section
864(c)(8) provides that a nonresident who owns “an interest in a
partnership which is engaged in any trade or business within the
United States” shall treat any “gain or loss on the sale or exchange”
as ECI regarding the conduct of the partnership.169 The statute
provides that ECI will be computed given a hypothetical liquidation:
first, imagine “the partnership had sold all of its assets at their fair
market value as of the date of the sale or exchange of such interest,”
and second, calculate the portion of the selling partner’s distributive
165 See id. at 493 (“When partners are transacting at arm's length, the economic effect and
substantiality rules are, at least in theory if not in practice, sensible. If two arm's length
partners want to use allocations to play tax games, then they must take the risk that one
partner might suffer a loss and the other might receive a windfall.”).
166 See Sheppard, supra note 157.
167 Id.
168 Cf. id. (noting that the lawyer who argued the GMM case for the taxpayers joked that
“If it works, it's a beautiful thing,” suggesting that even he had strong doubts about the
legality of the aggressive transaction). It is unclear if the § 704 substantiality requirement or
other anti-abuse rules would have been able to stop this abusive planning opportunity.
169 I.R.C. § 864(c)(8)(A) (2018).
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share on that hypothetical liquidation.170 The partnership reduces
any gain treated as ECI if the partner has § 897(g) gain.171 The
statute also gives broad authority to the Treasury to promulgate
regulations regarding certain non-recognition Code provisions like
§§ 332 and 351.172
Congress added a withholding provision, § 1446(f), which
requires a partnership to withhold “10 percent of the amount
realized on the disposition.”173 This withholding provision was vital.
Although the Treasury could have arguably promogulated a
regulation superseding GMM, the agency would not have enacted a
withholding obligation without Congressional intervention.174
Without § 1446(f), the Treasury’s policy would have been for naught:
the right tax policy with no additional tax revenue.
Section 864(c)(8) is not an explicit codification of Rev. Rul. 91-32,
nor does it overrule GMM.175 The statute provides a look-through
approach for ECI purposes without expressing an opinion on the
source of the gain or the entity or aggregate debate. And while §
864(c)(8) offers an aggregate flavor for the calculation of ECI gain,
it simultaneously provides an entity flavor for withholding under §
1446 and potentially an entity flavor regarding non-recognition
provisions.
3. A Convoluted, Unfair, and Unwieldy Solution
Setting the sound policy intentions aside, § 864(c)(8) is a poor
solution to the problem. First, the statute only exacerbates the § 864
convoluted “maze” that foreign taxpayers need to navigate in order

I.R.C. § 864(c)(8)(B) (2018).
I.R.C. § 864(c)(8)(C) (2018).
172 I.R.C. § 864(c)(8)(E) (2018).
173 I.R.C. § 1446(f)(1) (2018).
174 See Trump & Graham, supra note 72, at 27829 (noting that even if Rev. Rul. 91-32 was
correct, the guidance failed “to consider how, if at all, the IRS and Treasury would collect the
underlying tax due on the sale”).
175 See THE STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC
LAW 115-97, 220 (Dec. 2018) (noting that the “overturns the result in” GMM but does not
codify the previous approach taken in Rev. Rul. 91-32); Nils Cousin, How Do the New Rules
for Sales of Partnership Interests Interact With Income Tax Treaties?, 47 TAX MGMT. INT’L J.
363, 366 (June 08, 2018) (“Section 864(c)(8) has been described as a codification of Rev. Rul.
91-32. However, a more accurate description may be that it codified the result in Rev. Rul.
91-32, but did not codify the approach used in the ruling to get to that result.”).
170
171
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to comply with their U.S. tax obligations.176 Section 864(c)(8) “does
not address broader ECI and sourcing issues touched upon in Rev.
Rul. 91-32 and” GMM.177 That is, the most confusing part in this
sourcing analysis—all of the cross-references and the panoply of
tests taxpayers need to use—remains after the TCJA.178
Because Congress did not change this sourcing analysis, some
commentators have suggested that § 864(c)(8) does not supersede
the GMM opinion. Put differently, some argue that a nonresident
may still not need to pay tax when the partner sells her partnership
interest for a gain.179 The problem with the statute is that it does
not address the source of the gain, which as this Note covered in
Part II, is separate and distinct from the ECI analysis.180 This
fundamental flaw is the same fundamental flaw that the IRS failed
to convincingly address in Rev. Rul. 91-32,181 in its arguments in the
GMM case,182 and in the § 864(c)(8) proposed regulations.183
Without addressing the source rule, and the U.S. Office Rule in
particular, the government has a significant degree of litigation risk
176 See generally Alan B. Stevenson, Is the Connection Effective? Through the Maze of
Section 864, 5 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 213 (1983).
177 Bae, supra note 47.
178 Nothing in § 864(c)(8) changes or supersedes the byzantine rules of sourcing and ECI.
Section 864(c)(8)(A) merely provides that the sale “of such interest shall be treated as
effectively connected with the conduct of such trade or business”—meaning that such interest
must be categorized as U.S. source income under the U.S. Office Rule. See supra note 55.
Section 864(c)(8)(B) then provides for a limitation to the amount of ECI that a partner will
recognize under § 864(c)(2).
179 See Lee A. Shepperd, Implementing Taxation of Foreign Sales of Partnership Interests,
162 TAX NOTES TODAY 723 (Feb. 18, 2019) (noting that “[u]nder the new statute, effective
connection is not determined based on the source of the gain,” which “is usually the first
question” that needs to be addressed); cf. Blanchard, supra note 63, at 547 (noting that the
government applied GMM after § 864(c)(8) was enacted because the “IRS dislikes the narrow
constraints of the U.S. office rule when it applies to foreign persons”).
180 See Sheppard, supra note 179, at 723; supra Part II.B.5.
181 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
182 See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
183 See Gain or Loss of Foreign Persons from Sale or Exchange of Certain Partnership
Interests, 83 Fed. Reg. 66647, 66649 (proposed Dec. 27, 2018) (noting that “[n]either section
864(c)(8) nor the proposed regulations address the source of gain or loss from the transfer of
a partnership interest” and requesting comments as to “whether, and what, additional
guidance is necessary regarding the source of gain or loss subject to section 864(c)(8)”). The
proposed regulations take a rebuttable presumption approach to the U.S. Office Rule. Under
the approach, “gain or loss” under § 864(c)(8) “is treated as attributable to an office or other
fixed place of business maintained by the partnership in the United States” unless the asset
did not produce any ECI income or gain in the ten years before sale or the asset was not used
in a U.S. trade or business in the ten years before sale. Id. at 66652.
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when litigating a similar case. Taxpayers may still be able to escape
taxation by relying on GMM for the proposition that the gain is not
U.S. sourced income because the U.S. Office Rule does not apply
when a nonresident sells or redeems her partnership interest for a
gain. This result contravenes the Congressional intent of taxing
nonresidents and superseding the GMM result,184 but is possible
given a strict textual reading of the statute.
Additionally, Congress did not express any intentions on the
broader entity-aggregate debate critical to the GMM opinion;
Congress merely provided a look-through band-aid fix without
addressing the hard, yet essential, fundamental questions.
Congress has kicked the proverbial entity-aggregate and the ECI
sourcing cans down the road. Perhaps Congressional members hope
that they will be long retired before having to deal with these
convoluted questions again.
Second, the Congressional solution is unfair to foreign investors.
Although one of the goals of the TCJA was to “level the playing field
for inbound investors” into the U.S., § 864(c)(8) sends a “signal[] that
making the United States a more attractive investment opportunity
was not as high of a priority for lawmakers.”185 One problem with
the statute is that it does not provide a de minimis rule, which in
some situations could burden foreign investors with added
compliance costs that far exceed any tax revenue that the U.S.
would obtain.186 Nor does the statute give a minority partner a
mechanism from which to calculate the nature and inside basis of

See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
Michele Alexander and Ryan Davis, Tax Reform Is Hurting Foreign Investors In The
US, LAW360 (Mar. 22, 2018, 12:37 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1024847/taxreform-is-hurting-foreign-investors-in-the-us. Cf. Jonathan William Benowitz, Comment,
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Reverses Short Lived Grecian Magnesite Mining Holding: Will the U.S.
Depart from Global Norms in Tax Treaty Interpretation?, 15 LOY. U. CHI. INT'L L. REV. 171,
190 (2018) (noting that § 864(c)(8) may “discourage investment in U.S. business ventures”
because “foreign investors in the United States cannot be sure that their country's treaty will
protect them from United States taxing gain on their sale of a U.S. partnership interest”).
186 See AM. BAR ASS’N SECTION ON TAXATION, Comments On Sections 864(C)(8) And
1446(F) As Added To The Internal Revenue Code Of 1986 By P.L. 115-97 On December 22,
2018, at 18 (Mar. 18, 2018) [hereinafter ABA Report] (recommending the IRS provide for a
de minimis rule because “[m]any transactions involving sales of partnership interests involve
small amounts, relative to the situations that apparently motivated the statutory
provisions”). Even so, this Note believes that it is unlikely that the IRS will create a de
minimis rule because such a rule may exceed the agency’s statutory authority.
184
185
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each partnership asset.187 The IRS could audit and impose penalties
on a nonresident who fails to calculate her § 864(c)(8) gain even if
the amount of compliance costs exceeds the amount of gain or even
if the partnership refused to give the partner information she needs
to calculate the tax.
Although one of the sound intentions of §864(c)(8) was that it
would create parity between a nonresident selling assets and a
nonresident selling an interest in a partnership interest, § 864(c)(8)
actually creates a parity problem because the nonresident investing
in a partnership is treated worse than if she would have held the
assets in her own name. Partnerships will likely withhold an
amount under § 1446 which is higher than the amount of tax the
nonresident will owe under § 864(c)(8).188 And when the nonresident
files her tax return, she will likely be unable to take the new
“passthrough deduction” under § 199A.189
In response to this inequitable treatment, nonresidents will be
encouraged to invest through a corporate blocker. But investing
through a blocker adds significant costs. Nonresidents would either
have to struggle with the inequitable outcome discussed above or
face two levels of taxation.190 And nonresidents would have
significantly higher compliance costs than if they had just invested
directly into a U.S. partnership.191
Third, § 864(c)(8) is an unwieldy statute. Even if nonresidents
invest in U.S. partnerships without the use of a blocker, the
nonresident would be unable to comply with her tax obligations

187 See Lee A. Sheppard, Is Withholding on Sales of Partnership Interests Enforceable?,
2018 TAX NOTES TODAY 1197 (Aug. 27, 2018) (noting that a minority owner “has no way of
knowing or getting information about the nature and inside basis of a partnership’s assets”);
cf. Trump & Graham, supra note 72, at 278-30 (discussing the “issue of information sharing”
when a minority partner is “required to determine the nature of the assets in a partnership .
. . in order to apply and determine its tax liability” but does not have information needed to
do the computations).
188 See ABA Report, supra note 186, at 18.
189 Ajay Gupta, A Passthrough Deduction for Foreigners, 2018 TAX NOTES TODAY 509, 512–
13 (Apr. 23, 2018) (discussing the policy and legal arguments for and against nonresidents
investing in U.S. partnerships taking the § 199A deduction).
190 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
191 Cf. Polsky & Roszenweig, supra note 64, at 463 (discussing how “foreign investors
necessitate blockers” which creates a “more unwieldy” ownership structure).
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without the use of sophisticated tax advisers.192 The statute itself
leaves a lot of questions unanswered.193 Answering these questions
requires complicated solutions.194 Taxpayers have highlighted
potential abuse from the statute when nonresidents contribute their
partnership share into another entity. Simply put, a taxpayer can
escape his tax obligation and remove the partnership’s withholding
obligation by contributing his partnership interest into a newly
formed partnership195 or corporation.196
If the history of § 897(g) is a guide, the IRS cannot provide
enough comfort to practitioners and taxpayers looking to comply
with their obligations. That statute provides that a nonresident’s
gain from a sale of a partnership interest will be U.S. sourced if a
portion of that gain relates to real property held in the United
States.197 Many of the same issues the IRS faced with § 897(g)
appear in § 864(c)(8).198 Yet thirty-eight years after the enactment
of § 897(g), the IRS has yet to promulgate any regulations “as to how
to calculate the tax due under §897(g).”199

192 Cf. Trump & Graham, supra note 72, at 278-30 (“[A] rule that requires a foreign
transferor of a partnership interest to report and pay U.S. tax, even if laudable from a policy
perspective, makes little if any sense if it is impossible to apply.”).
193 See Rachuba, supra note 158, at 528 (noting that the statute “is very general and
resolves precious few of the concerns raised by commentators about the” earlier legislative
proposals in 2016 and 2017).
194 The American Bar Association and New York State Bar have already provided robust
reports on the many pitfalls of § 864(c)(8). See generally ABA Report, supra note 186; N.Y. ST.
BAR ASS’N, TAX SEC., Report on Guidance Implementing Revenue Ruling 91-32 (Jan. 21,
2014); N.Y. ST. BAR ASS’N, TAX SEC., Report on Sections 864(C)(8) and 1446(F) (Aug. 10, 2018).
195 See Fanny Karaman & Stanley Ruchelman, How to Minimize Withholding Tax on Sale
Of LLC Interest, LAW360 (Jul. 05, 2018), https://0-www.law360.com/articles/1059815/how-tominimize-withholding-tax-on-sale-of-llc-interest (discussing a scenario in which a foreign
partner first contributes his partnership interest into a U.S. partnership, which would in turn
sell the partnership interest to a third party and not need to withhold any tax).
196 The buying partner could keep the partnership interest in the corporation forever or
could dissolve the corporation immediately after buying it. If the buying partner prefers not
to hold the partnership interest in corporate solution, the buying partner can negotiate a
gross-up, so that the buying partner could liquidate the corporation soon after buying it and
pay the same after tax that it would have paid for the partnership interest directly. See ABA
Report, supra note 186, at 10.
197 See supra note 83.
198 See Kim Blanchard, Gain or Loss on Sales of Partnership Interests by Foreign Partners:
Issues for Guidance Under §864(c)(8) and §1446(f), 47 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. (June 8, 2018)
(“Many of the issues presented by these new provisions are similar to those presented by
§897(g) and §1445.”).
199 Id. (emphasis added).
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Some commentators have even suggested that the problems
raised by § 864(c)(8) are more difficult than the problems of § 897(g)
due to the flexible nature of the partnership arrangements.200 The
Treasury proposed regulations in December 2018 that address
many taxpayer concerns.201 Although the regulations generally
provide a useful “formulaic approach” to figure out the amount of
gain, some commentators stress that the rules “appear to place a
significant burden on partnerships with foreign partners.”202 No
doubt most taxpayers who have access to big accounting firms can
comply with this obligation. But it remains to be seen whether other
taxpayers can comply with these onerous obligations.
IV. WHAT CONGRESS SHOULD DO
The saga of Rev. Rul. 91-32 is not yet complete. Sooner or later,
Congress will realize it needs to write a better statute which will
not over-burden nonresidents from investing in U.S. partnerships.
This section provides a series of recommendations to fix the thorny
intersection between partnership and international taxation. These
four suggestions work together to address the problem without
opening the door to abusive tactics that undermine the ability of the
IRS to tax the gain on appreciated assets.
A. REPEAL §§ 864(C)(8) & 897(G)

Congress should repeal §§ 864(c)(8) and 897(g). These statutes
are unwieldy and unworkable.203 Nonresidents will likely continue
to invest through blocker corporations, rather than try to comply
with these onerous requirements. Investing through blocker
corporations, however, adds another layer of unnecessary
200 See id. (“The calculations and procedural issues raised by new §864(c)(8) and §1446(f)
are far more complex and difficult than those presented by [§ 897(g)].”).
201 Gain or Loss of Foreign Persons from Sale or Exchange of Certain Partnership Interests,
83 Fed. Reg. 66647 (proposed Dec. 27, 2018).
202 ERNST & YOUNG LLP, US PROPOSED REGULATIONS ADDRESS CHARACTERIZATION OF
FOREIGN PERSONS’ TAXABLE GAIN OR LOSS FROM SALE OR EXCHANGE OF INTERESTS IN
PARTNERSHIPS ENGAGED IN BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 7, 2019). See also Rachuba,
supra note 158 (arguing that the problems created by § 864(c)(8) “could be addressed by some
really complicated rules” but that it is not “worth the time, energy, and complexity of
everyone” trying to comply with the rules).
203 See supra Part III.D.3.
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complexity. We should not have a system where nonresidents who
want to infuse their capital into U.S. partnerships need to engage
with expensive tax advisers before investing. But Congress needs to
enact safeguards to ensure we do not end up with a pre-GMM result.
B. PROVIDE SAFEGUARDS FOR ABUSE VIA § 743(A)

Congress should enact two safeguards in § 743(a). One, Congress
should add another subsection to § 743: if a nonresident or a relatedparty-tax-exempt entity sells a partnership interest at a gain, the
partnership must prove that the gain was subject to taxation in the
U.S. before the partnership takes an adjustment under § 743. A
1997 tax bill proposed in the House of Representatives provided a
similar solution. In that bill, Congress proposed that in a sale of
property between a “tax-exempt entity and a related person,” the
buyer’s basis would be limited to the adjusted basis of the seller. 204
The buying partner would not get the benefit of the inside basis
adjustment under § 743 if the nonresident selling partner did not
pay U.S. tax.205 This subsection would ensure that the United States
does not lose the ability to tax appreciation of partnership assets. It
also provides a more administrable system for taxpayers and the
IRS.206
Two, if the partnership makes a § 743(b) basis adjustment,
Congress should require that the partnership compute the selling
partner’s tax based on a look-through approach.207 This proposal
would apply to all partnership dispositions, not just ones involving
204 H.R. REP. NO. 105–148, at 159 (1997) (Conf. Rep.) (proposing a new § 1061 in the Code
that provides “[i]n the case of a sale or exchange of property directly or indirectly between a
tax-exempt entity and a related person, the basis of the related person in the property
acquired shall not exceed the adjusted basis of such property (immediately before the
exchange) in the hands of the tax-exempt entity, increased by the amount of gain recognized
to the tax-exempt entity on the transfer which is subject to tax under section 511.”).
205 See supra note 157. This solution has some practitioner support. See Trump & Graham,
supra note 72, at 278 (discussing the 1997 legislative proposal to “deny the . . . Sec. 743
adjustment in toto” and arguing that the “result is entirely appropriate and would preserve
the U.S. federal income tax on ECI assets” (citing Blanchard, supra note 17)). But none of the
authors that proposed this idea believed such a comprehensive solution was necessary.
206 Put differently, this type of approach would provide an “entity-type” treatment because
the selling partner would not need to calculate gain; as articulated before, the main source of
complexity results from the aggregate or look-through approach treatment.
207 Professor Gregg Polsky suggested this idea in an email to the author. Email from Gregg
Polsky, Francis Shackelford Distinguished Professor in Taxation Law, University of Georgia
School of Law to Robert Daily (Sept. 12, 2018) (on file with author).
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nonresidents. But this proposal is needed because the current
system for taxing the selling partner is flawed, as it is both “unduly
favorable to taxpayers and unduly unfavorable to taxpayers”
relative to a look-through or aggregate-type approach.208 This Note’s
proposal combines the entity and aggregate concepts discussed in
Part III—adopting an aggregate-type approach if the partnership
makes a § 743(b) adjustment and an entity-type approach absent
such adjustment.
As the previous Part explained, a pure look-through approach is
an inefficient solution.209 Congress should not force each and every
partnership to calculate the look-through gain as it currently does
under § 864(c)(8). Instead, Congress should only require a lookthrough approach when partnerships make a § 743 adjustment. The
information the selling partner needs to calculate a look-through
gain is the same information the partnership needs to make a § 743
adjustment. This Note’s proposal is more administrable than any
other solution because it would provide an “opt-in” rule that only
applies if the partnership wants to make a basis adjustment. If the
partnership does not want to deal with the complexity, the
partnership can use the traditional entity method to compute gain
or loss and forgo the § 743(b) basis adjustment.210
C. SIMPLIFY THE SOURCING RULES

The GMM case highlights three things about sourcing. First, the
rules are too confusing.211 The GMM court itself got tangled up in
the sourcing web and misstated which statute applied in the case.212
Second, the rules, especially after the enactment of § 864(c)(8), are
inequitable. Foreign investors are less likely to invest in U.S.

208 See generally Emily Cauble, Taxing Selling Partners, 94 WASH. L. REV., at *42
(forthcoming 2019).
209 See supra part III.D.3. But see id. at *43–44 (arguing that her approach does not result
in an unduly burdensome method of computing gain or loss relative to the current system).
210 Nevertheless, partnerships that need to make the § 743(b) adjustment because of a
substantial built-in-loss are out of luck. Still, the thrust of the argument remains because
Congress forces partnerships with such a built-in-loss to make the basis adjustment, so the
added administrative complexity in these situations is low.
211 Bae, supra note 47 (“Furthermore, perhaps in illustrating the uncertainty in the
application of the ECI rules, [GMM] may serve as a valid criticism of the current taxing
regime.”).
212 See supra note 62.
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companies after TCJA due to the difficulties of complying with the
statute.213 Third, the fundamental flaw of the sourcing rules applied
to nonresidents selling a partnership interest is that the U.S. Office
Rule likely does not apply. These partners escape taxation because
the U.S. office of the partnership conducting business in the United
States is likely not a “material factor” in the production of that gain
and the office does not “regularly carr[y] on activities of the type
from which” the gain “is derived.”214 And as addressed in the
previous section, the flaw in the U.S. Office Rule still exists postTCJA.215 To provide real international tax reform, Congress needs
to write better sourcing rules.
This Note recommends that Congress discontinue the U.S. Office
Rule requirement under § 865(e)(3). Congress may want to enact in
its place a prophylactic rule that states any sale from or to a U.S.
Office (including any sale of a partnership interest) will be
presumed to be ECI and U.S. sourced income under § 865(e)(2)
unless a taxpayer can prove that the sale was not derived from a
U.S. Office. This rule will serve as a burden-shifting mechanism:
foreign taxpayers, will need to prove that the gain should not be
taxed rather than the government trying to prove that the gain
should be taxed. This proposed statute would be similar to the
approach taken in § 864(c)(8) proposed regulations.216 With this
change, partnerships with foreign partners will no longer need to
engage with the convoluted regular activities and material factor
tests. Such a rule would also eliminate the potential litigation risk
that § 864(c)(8) does not actually supersede GMM.217

See supra Part III.D.3.
See supra Part II.B.2.
215 See supra Part IV.D.3.
216 See supra note 183.
217 See supra note 179 and accompanying text. Kim Blanchard has noted that the
government may have regulatory authority to correct this flaw, but that it does not want the
rule “when the shoe is on the other foot,” (i.e., when the government is trying to tax outbound
multinational investors who are arguing that their property should be foreign sourced instead
of in the U.S.). Blanchard, supra note 63, at 547. In the process, she argues that the
government “wants to have its cake and eat it too” by not promulgating a regulation in which
the U.S. Office Rule does not apply to both U.S. residents and nonresidents. Id. Blanchard is
correct in noting that we need to treat taxpayers equitably with respect to the ECI rules, but
this Note argues that such an approach is not justified for the sourcing rules given the real
threat of a nonresident escaping taxation.
213
214
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With this proposal, it is likely that the GMM case would have
been decided the other way: there would be a presumption that the
taxpayer’s sale would be ECI and U.S. sourced income, and the
taxpayer would have been unable to show that the presumption was
inappropriate.
An even better solution would be to substitute “old-fashioned”
and cumbersome rules in §§ 864 and 865 with “broad general
theories of value creation.”218 This is easier said than done.219 One
solution would be to provide a formula to a company’s worldwide
sales. The multinational entity would multiply its worldwide
income by the company’s percentage of U.S. property, sales, and
payroll—similar to how multi-state entities “apportion” and source
income to a particular state.220 Although this proposal is more of a
rough-justice solution, it would both prevent the gamesmanship and
replace the outdated sourcing statutes.221
D. PROVIDE A COMPOSITE RETURN FOR NONRESIDENTS

Congress should also allow partnerships to pay tax on behalf of
any nonresidents via a composite tax return. This composite return
would fulfill the nonresident’s U.S. tax filing obligation and provide
an efficient way for the government to collect tax on U.S. sourced
income, similar to the composite returns that some states require
for partnerships who have nonresident partners.222 A nonresident
218 Kim Blanchard used this phrase when explaining her thoughts on why the government
appealed the GMM case, but it applies equally to the proposition it supports. See Blanchard,
supra note 63, at 547.
219 Blanchard notes that the government believes such an approach “is too fuzzy, and too
easy for taxpayers and governments to game.” Id. But considering that the rest of the
developed world is taxing residents based on a value creation method, this author believes
that such an approach is necessary, especially by using a less-gameable apportionment-type
model described below.
220 See Walter Hellerstein, International Income Allocation in the Twenty-first Century: The
Case for Formulary Apportionment, INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J., May–June 2005, at 103
(arguing for a formulaic approach to sourcing income).
221 See id. at 111 (arguing that the current method of sourcing income is “theoretically
questionable and practically inadministrable”).
222 See Peter L. Faber, State and Local Tax Planning for Partnerships, 2017 STATE TAX
NOTES 463, 471 (May 1, 2017) (“Recognizing the administrative burden on partners, many
states allow a partnership to file a composite return for its nonresident partners, in which
case the partners — though required by the partnership to pay their share of tax — do not
have to file separate returns in those states. Typically, a partner can be in a composite return
only if it has no other income from the state.”); cf. Marc Yassinger, An Updated Consideration

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/glr/vol53/iss2/10

42

Daily: Guidance Is Definitive, Reality Is Frequently Inaccurate: The Lin

2019]

LINGERING SAGA OF REV. RUL. 91-32

843

investing in a partnership that does business in another state need
not invest through a blocker corporation to avoid filing a tax return
in that state; the partnership simply needs to make a composite
return election.
The current use of blocker structures is cumbersome and
unnecessary. A composite return is a better solution and may
encourage more investment in the United States.223 There may be a
political rationale not to allow certain types of investments, but
such justification cannot be found in tax policy.
V. CONCLUSION
The crossroads of partnership and international tax law remain
difficult to navigate. This Note considered the collateral effects of
Rev. Rul. 91-32, GMM, and the Congressional response to GMM.
First, this Note considered the broader entity and aggregate debate
as applied by practitioners, by the IRS in Rev. Rul. 91-32, by the
Tax Court in GMM, and by Congress in the TCJA. Second, this Note
provided a list of solutions to solve the puzzling interaction of the
international and partnership tax provisions. If this Note has
explained anything, it is that the saga of Rev. Rul. 91-32 is far from
over.

of a Taxing Problem: The Harmonization of State and Local Tax Laws Affecting Nonresident
Professional Athletes, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENTM’T L.J. 751, 764 (1997) (arguing for a
composite return model for professional athletes such that the team can file a return and
satisfy their player’s state tax obligations).
223 That is, foreign investors invest in U.S. partnerships despite having to pay two levels of
tax on any gain. Combine this U.S. tax with the nonresident’s home county tax and it is likely
that the foreign investor’s after-tax gain is lower than a U.S. investor’s after-tax gain would
be. A composite return eliminates one level of the foreign investor’s U.S. tax, which would
necessarily increase their after-tax return and would likely increase foreign investor’s
propensity to invest in the United States.
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